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Persons with intellectual disability are a group at risk of being exposed to overly demanding prob-
lem-solving situations, which may produce learned helplessness. the research was based on the 
informational model of learned helplessness. the consequences of exposure to an unsolvable task 
and the ability to recognize the symptoms of cognitive exhaustion were tested in 120 students with 
mild intellectual disability. After the exposure to the unsolvable task, persons in the experimental 
group obtained lower results than the control group in the escape/avoidance learning task, but 
a similar result was found in the divergent thinking fluency task. Also, participants in the experi-
mental group had difficulties recognizing the symptoms of the cognitive exhaustion state. After 
a week’s time, the difference in escape/avoidance learning performance was still observed. the 
results indicate that exposure to unsolvable tasks may negatively influence the cognitive perform-
ance in persons with intellectual disability, although those persons may not identify the cognitive 
state related to lowered performance.
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Intellectual disability is defined by deficits in intellectual and every-
day adaptive functioning, with an onset in the developmental period 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013; Schalock et al., 2007). 
Most persons who fulfill the diagnostic criteria for this category fall 
within the range of mild severity. Although it is estimated that there 
exist over 250 biomedical causes of intellectual disability (Greenspan, 
1999) and over 750 genetic syndromes related to this category (Harris, 
2006; Hodapp, 2001), genetic and organic etiology is not identified in 
30-50% of cases (Goharpey, Crewther, & Crewther, 2009; Hodapp, 
Burack, & Zigler, 1998; Iarocci & Petrill, 2012). Mild intellectual dis-
ability individuals with no specific genetic etiology usually possess a 
normal appearance, without physical stigmata indicating their state. 
In accordance with the current educational policies, such individuals 
are often placed in inclusive educational units (Snyder & Dillow, 2015; 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
[UNESCO], 2009). The common absence of visible signs of disability 
and the context of being placed among students from the general popu-
lation increase the risk of being exposed to overly demanding cognitive 
tasks within everyday situations. Such an exposure may lead to learned 
helplessness, having a negative impact on a person’s performance.
Learned helplessness was first described based on the results ob-
tained in animal studies. In the original experiments, dogs exposed to 
inescapable electric shocks demonstrated performance deficits in sub-
sequent learning tasks (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 
1967). The significance of these studies lay not in the mere description 
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of the deficits observed when aversive stimuli were applied but rather 
in the theoretical mechanism proposed by the authors (Overmier, 
2002). According to the learned helplessness hypothesis, perceived un-
controllability leads to expectations about the future which impair the 
learning process (LoLordo & Taylor, 2001; Maier & Seligman, 1976). 
The performance deficits observed in learning tasks were described 
as motivational and cognitive in nature. The first of these deficits is 
reflected in the fact that the subject initiated fewer responses, and 
the second deficit is reflected in the fact that even when the correct 
response was given, the subject was less likely to learn its relevance. 
Despite the fact that during the first two decades from the date of the 
theory’s introduction numerous studies involving animal and human 
subjects have demonstrated the negative effects of learned helpless-
ness (for a review see Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993), researchers 
continue to study this concept, attempting to refine the original theory 
by identifying other factors that influence behavior, for example, in-
vestigating the role of failure feedback (Hatfield & Job, 1998; Matute, 
1994), or the attentional deficits associated with the condition (Minor, 
Jackson, & Maier, 1984; Reed & Antonova, 2007), or the possibility that 
alternative principles explain the described phenomenon. 
From the field of cognitive psychology, an informational approach 
to learned helplessness, proposed by Sędek and Kofta (1990), has 
emerged. These authors pointed out that the objective uncontrol-
lability, crucial to the development of helplessness, may have differ-
ent effects on behavior as a result of various factors (e.g., Bukowski, 
Asanowicz, Marzecova, & Lupianez, 2014; Mikulincer, Kedem, & 
Zilkha-Segal, 1989; Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 
1980). According to Sędek and Kofta (1990) learned helplessness oc-
curs when a person initially does not recognize that the task is beyond 
their control because such recognition would mean that the person 
would not be involved cognitively in the task. When a person tries to 
exert control by finding a solution but repeatedly fails to do so, they 
experience a state of cognitive exhaustion. Such a state is characterized 
by diminished and less efficient usage of a person’s cognitive resources. 
The prolonged lack of success inhibits the tendency to engage in the 
production of new thoughts and ideas, which leads to difficulties in 
the tackling of subsequent tasks, especially those that are novel and 
complex. Persons in a state of cognitive exhaustion find demanding 
mental activity unpleasant and experience negative emotions (Sędek 
& Kofta, 1990; Von Hecker, Sędek, & McIntosh, 2000). Their cognitive 
impairments closely resemble those present in persons with symptoms 
of depression (Von Hecker & Sędek, 1999; Von Hecker, Sędek, & 
Brzezicka, 2013). In this view, in contrast to the original theory, learned 
helplessness is not something that follows the behavioral acts, but a 
phenomenon related to the difficulties in the hypothesis-testing stage 
of action development, when a person tries to construct a successful 
action program in order to achieve cognitive gain (Kofta & Sędek, 
1999; Sędek & Kofta, 1990; Sędek, Kofta, & Tyszka, 1993; Von Hecker 
et al., 2000). 
Learned helplessness symptoms are often linked to the psychologi-
cal characteristics of persons with intellectual disability (Heward, 2006; 
Richards, Brady, & Taylor, 2015). The results of studies indicate that 
persons with intellectual disability present more evidence of helpless-
ness than children matched on mental age (Gargiulo & O’Sullivan, 
1986; Gargiulo, O’Sullivan, & Barr, 1987). Such results were obtained 
at mental age levels of above seven years, which lead one to the con-
clusion that helplessness symptoms are acquired gradually over the 
years (Weisz, 1979, 1981, 1999). In other studies, learned helplessness 
symptoms in persons with intellectual disability were associated with 
attentional functioning (Utley, Hoehn, Soraci, & Baumeister, 1993), 
communicative interactions (Basil, 1992), and depression (Reynolds & 
Miller, 1985). So far, none of the conducted studies have referred to the 
informational model of learned helplessness.
The purpose of the present study was to test the effects that exposure 
to an unsolvable task has on performance in subsequent cognitive tasks 
in persons with intellectual disability and to evaluate whether persons 
in this group are able to recognize the symptoms of a state of cognitive 
exhaustion. We used four measures. Firstly, the discrimination task 
based on the description given by Sędek and Kofta (1990) was used 
to invoke the cognitive exhaustion state. Two tasks were used in the 
test phase: the escape/avoidance learning task (Sędek & Kofta, 1990), 
measuring the performance in a situation which requires hypothesis-
testing, and the divergent thinking fluency task, based on a concept 
frequently used in studies on creativity (Benderek, Muhlmann, Jauk, 
& Neubauer, 2013), measuring performance in a situation in which a 
person puts effort into the production of as many ideas as possible. It 
was assumed that the exposure to an unsolvable task would negatively 
influence performance in both subsequent tasks. In order to test the 
perception of the cognitive exhaustion symptoms, we used the ques-
tionnaire developed by Sędek and Kofta. Since persons who perform 
poorly at tasks tend to overestimate their performance due to a lack 
of ability to recognize their deficits (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & 
Kruger, 2003; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, 
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008) and persons with intellectual disability may 
be even more prone than persons in the general population to expe-
rience difficulties in connecting their performance to internal causes 
and effectively judging their ability (Wehmeyer, 1994, 2001), it was 
predicted that persons with intellectual disability would not identify 
the cognitive exhaustion state symptoms. We also predicted that, after 
a week, the difference in performance would still be present due to the 
fact that the learning ability during the first meeting was diminished. 
The discrimination task, the escape/avoidance learning task, and the 
cognitive exhaustion symptoms questionnaire were modified to fit the 
purpose of the study in the group of persons with intellectual disabil-
ity.
Four hypotheses were offered in reference to persons with mild 
intellectual disability: 
1. The exposure to an unsolvable task decreases learning effective-
ness. 
2. The exposure to an unsolvable task decreases divergent thinking 
fluency. 
3. Symptoms of the cognitive exhaustion state are not identified 
properly.
4. The exposure to an unsolvable task has a long-term effect on 
learning effectiveness.
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MaterIal and Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 120 students (62 boys and 58 girls) recruited 
from a special vocational school for persons with mild intellectual 
disability in Kraków. The participants’ age ranged from 16 to 23 years 
(Mage = 18.07, SD = 1.57). All students had been diagnosed with mild 
intellectual disability at a psychological-pedagogical counseling centre. 
We randomly selected students without identified organic etiology, 
such as Down Syndrome or Fragile-X Syndrome, and no secondary 
diagnoses, such as sensory impairment or psychopathology. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee of Jagiellonian University and 
by the school board. Written consent was obtained from the students 
and their parents. All participants were informed that their responses 
would be anonymous and that they could withdraw from the study 
at any time. From among those who fulfilled the selection criteria, 
only two students refused to participate in the study. Sixty participants 
were assigned to the experimental group (30 boys and 30 girls, Mage = 
17.67, SD = 1.37), which was presented with an unsolvable task, and 




The discrimination task was based on Sędek and Kofta (1990). We 
used 32 cards divided into 16 pairs. Each card was comprised of five 
features associated with the features on the other card from the pair. 
The paired features were: “man-woman,” “day-night,” “dog-cat,” “owl-
pigeon,” and “triangle-circle.” Depending on the pair, different features 
were presented on the left or on the right side. An example pair of cards 
is presented in Figure 1.
The discrimination task consisted of six trials. The first three trials 
were the same in both the experimental and the control group. The 
experimenter instructed the person to choose a proper card based 
on one of the features. The person was told that in the first trial, the 
proper cards are those with the “day” feature. If a person pointed to the 
card with the day feature, the experimenter said “yes, that’s the proper 
card”, if not - “no, that’s not the proper card.” In the first trial, seven 
pairs of cards were shown. In the next trial, the experimenter again 
informed the participant that he or she was required to point to the 
proper cards, but this time the proper cards needed to be decided upon 
based on discrimination between two elements: pigeon or owl. Each 
time a person pointed to the card with the owl, the experimenter said 
that it was the proper card, while each time the card with the pigeon 
was chosen, the experimenter said that it was not the proper card. This 
task consisted of nine pairs of cards. In the third trial, consisting of 16 
pairs of cards, participants were told that they need to choose a proper 
card based on four elements. In Trials 4 to 6, the conditions changed 
for both the experimental and control group. The experimental group 
was told that they needed to choose the proper card based on six, 
eight, and then 10 elements. In this group, the task was unsolvable. 
The experimenter gave the answer “no, that’s not the proper card” at a 
ratio of 2:1. When each trial was finished, the person was asked which 
element was correct and the experimenter commented “no, that wasn’t 
the proper element.” We decided to provide information about failure 
in each trial, since we assumed that persons with intellectual disability, 
due to their lack of criticism, might still consider their answers to be 
correct, regardless of the informational inconsistency. The control 
group in Trials 4 to 6 was given solvable problems, each time receiving 
the true information about whether the element chosen after the trial 
was or was not correct.
At the end of each consecutive trial, the person was asked to name 
the proper feature or element and to answer four questions: (a) “How 
certain are you that you found the correct answer?”, (b) “how well do 
you think you did on this trial?”, (c) “how did you feel while solving the 
Figure 1.
the pair of cards used in the discrimination task.
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task?”, and (d) “how well do you think you will do on the next trial?” 
To every question, each person could give answers which were rated on 
a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 represented the uncertainty and negative 
emotions indicating a state of cognitive exhaustion and 4 the absence 
of such judgments.
EscapE/avoiDancE lEarning task
The escape/avoidance learning task was based on the description 
in Sędek and Kofta (1990). We prepared a computer with three letters 
on the keyboard marked with yellow, red, and blue paper. The task was 
comprised of two trials. In each trial, a sequence was presented on the 
screen: first a green square, then a red square with a five-second expo-
sure time. Then, the screen went blank and, in the case of an incorrect 
answer, a three-second noise came from the computer’s speakers. The 
first trial was comprised of 10 sequences, and the second trial - of 40. 
In the first trial, there was always one key which could stop the noise, 
no matter if the key was pushed when the green or red square was pre-
sented, and in the second trial, one key was associated with the green 
square and a different with the red one. Also, in both trials, there was 
one key associated with the noise, which a person could use when the 
noise had already been activated. The escape/avoidance learning effec-
tiveness was measured by the successful attempts at both preventing 
the signal and stopping it.
The person was told that the coloured squares would appear on the 
screen and that the goal of the task was to use one of the marked but-
tons to prevent the sound which came from the speakers. Information 
was given that if the correct button was pushed at the right time, the 
sound would not appear and that with each square, only the first but-
ton to be pushed counted. Participants were also informed that when 
the sound appeared, they could still try to stop it by using one of the 
marked buttons. Before the task started, the experimenter asked a per-
son to try and push each of the buttons.
DivErgEnt thinking fluEncy task
To measure divergent thinking fluency, three questions were de-
veloped which would allow us to obtain many possible answers. The 
number of answers generated by the participants was tabulated. The 
persons were instructed to give as many answers as possible regarding 
the situations described by the experimenter. The answers were written 
down. If a person gave only one answer, the experimenter was allowed 
to remind that a person was supposed to give as many answers as pos-
sible. Later, the experimenter did not prompt anymore. The situations 
presented to the participants were as follows: (a) “Imagine you’re at a 
cinema and you see a fire somewhere in the room. Tell me what you 
could do if you found yourself in such a situation. Try to give me as 
many possible answers as you can;” (b) “Imagine that you want to pre-
pare a pizza. Think about the ingredients you could use as topping. Try 
to name as many ingredients as possible, even those you don’t like;” (c) 
“Imagine that you want to buy a gift for your brother/sister (always the 
opposite sex to the participants’). You go to a mall and you can afford 
to buy anything you want. Name as many things as you can which you 
could buy.”
Exhaustion symptoms quEstionnairE
The questionnaire was developed by Sędek and Kofta (1990) to 
measure the subjective perception of a state of cognitive exhaustion. 
The item content was simplified for persons with intellectual disability. 
All the items were related to the cognitive and motivational difficulties 
which could indicate a state of cognitive exhaustion. The item content 
was:
(a) “I’m sure that I did well in the tasks I solved”;
(b) “I felt that I don’t want to solve another task”; 
(c) “When I was solving the tasks I felt I didn’t know what they 
    were about”;
(d) “I found pleasure in solving the tasks”;
(e) “It was difficult to figure out what the tasks were about”;
(f) “I didn’t know if my answers were correct or not”;
(g) “I felt bored while solving the tasks”;
(h) “It was easy to decide what answers I should give and which
     but tons to press”;
(i) “I found it difficult to focus on the tasks”; 
(j) “I felt good while solving the tasks”;
(k) “I found the tasks interesting”; 
(l) “I didn’t really know what to do during the tasks”.
Items 1, 4, 8, 10, and 11 were reversely scored. Each time a person 
could point to one of the four answers, this was evaluated on a scale of 1 
to 4, with higher numbers indicating higher cognitive exhaustion.
Procedure
All participants were tested at school in a specially prepared room. 
The experiment was carried out by two instructed female psychology 
students. The experimenters met each participant twice. During both 
meetings, the tested persons solved the discrimination task first, then 
the escape/avoidance learning task, and finally the divergent thinking 
fluency task. After finishing of all tasks, participants were asked to fill 
in the exhaustion symptoms questionnaire.
We manipulated the answers in the discrimination task of the 
experimental group. The participants in this group received the “no” 
answers in Trials 4 to 6 in a ratio of 2:1. The answers were not related 
to the participants’ actual performance. At the end of each consecu-
tive trial, the participants answered four questions about the task and 
pointed to the feature which they had chosen as correct. The partici-
pants in the experimental group were informed in Trials 4 to 6 that 
the feature they had chosen was not the proper one. Those within the 
control group were given solvable problems and appropriate feedback.
After the discrimination task, the participants were asked to sit in 
front of the computer where they solved the escape/avoidance learning 
task. The experimenter read the instruction before each trial and sat 
behind the tested person when each trial began. When the task was 
finished, the person was asked to move away from the computer and 
the divergent thinking fluency task was presented. The experimenter 
wrote down the answers given to each of the three questions. In the 
final part of the study, those tested received a questionnaire in which 
they marked their answers. All participants were told that they could 
ask about the items if they felt that they did not understand the con-
tent.
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After a week, a second meeting was held during which the same 
tasks were given. This time, those who solved the discrimination task 
in the experimental group received “yes” answers in a 2:1 ratio for 
Trials 4 to 6. We wanted to give those in the experimental group the 
impression that they were easily able to find the correct answer. After 
each trial, they were told that the feature or element they had chosen 
was correct. Next, the escape/avoidance learning task and the divergent 
thinking fluency task were given, and finally, participants filled in the 
questionnaire for the second time. When the experiment was finished, 
the purpose of the study was explained to the participants during 
classes. Figure 2 presents the diagram for the procedure followed.
Operational hypotheses
We formulated four operational hypotheses which refer to the hypoth-
eses offered in the introduction:
1. In the first meeting, the performance in the escape/avoidance 
learning task will be worse in the experimental group than in the con-
trol group.
2. In the first meeting, the performance in the divergent thinking 
fluency task will be worse in the experimental group than in the con-
trol group.
3. In the first meeting, there will be no difference between the 
control and experimental group in the exhaustion symptoms question-
naire.
4. In the second meeting, the performance in the escape/avoidance 
learning task will be worse in the experimental group than in the con-
trol group.
results
Most of the following analyses were performed with Welch’s t-test, 
which is a generalization of the Student t-test and intended for use 
when the samples have unequal variances. The correction for unequal 
variance may result in non-integer degrees of freedom.
To obtain a single measure of exhaustion, we used the mean value 
of the answers to questionnaire questions. The measure has a high 
correlation with an alternative measure—the principal component 
acquired in a factor analysis with varimax rotation (r = .97 for the first 
meeting and r = .99 for the second meeting).
Since one of our hypotheses stated that there was no difference 
between the groups, it could not be corroborated using frequentist 
statistical methods because stating the lack of a significant difference 
is not conclusive on the basis of these methods. To corroborate this 
hypothesis, we used the Bayes factor (K), that is, the ratio of observed 
data likelihood given the null hypothesis and the likelihood given 
an alternative hypothesis. To compute the Bayes factor, we used the 
BayesFactor package in R (Morey & Rouder, 2014).
Three participants (male, ages 16, 17, and 19 years, two from the 
control group) were excluded from further analysis due to their low 
certainty with regard to performance accuracy in the first three trials 
of the discrimination task (more than two SDs below the mean). Such 
a result would suggest that these students at the beginning of the study 
presented an uncertainty which would not allow for experimental 
manipulation.
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the main measures 
used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. Among the 66 tested 
correlations, 11 appeared to be statistically significant after applying 
Benjamini and Yekutieli’s (2001) correction for multiple tests. 
The answers to the question after each of the trials in the discrimi-
nation task were significantly correlated with each other (from r = .26 
to r = .72). The mean value of responses to all four questions was used 
to measure the level of uncertainty and the negative emotions associ-
ated with the learned helplessness. The mean values of answers to all 
the trial questions are presented in Table 2.
The repeated-measures ANOVA test reveals that the certainty 
changes between Trials 1-3 and 4-6 differently for the control and ex-
perimental group, F(1, 115) = 98.58, p < .001, η² = .16. A post-hoc test 
shows that the difference between Trials 1-3 (M = 3.47) and 4-6 (M = 
3.44) is not significant in the control group, t(57) = 0.73, p = .47, d = 
0.071, paired, while the difference (M = 3.34 and 2.62, respectively) is 
significant in the experimental group, t(58) = 12.47, p < 0.001, d = 1.79, 
paired (see Figure 3).
Figure 2.
the diagram presenting the experimental procedure.
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Hypothesis 1: Escape/avoidance 
Learning in the First Meeting
The escape/avoidance learning task consisted of two series. The first 
one consisted of ten trials and the second one of forty trials. Two 
measures were analyzed in the task: the proportion of prevented noise 
signals and the proportion of stopping not avoided signals during their 
presentation. The measures were correlated both in the first meeting, r 
= .3, 95% CI [.17, .41], and in the second meeting, r = .5, 95% CI [.38, 
.59]. Both floor and ceiling performance levels were observed in the 
case of preventing noise signals (29% and 9%, accordingly, in the first 
meeting and 25% and 29% in the second meeting) and in the case of 
stopping not prevented signals (33% and 16% in the first meeting and 
25% and 27% in the second meeting). The distributions of the propor-
tions of prevented signals were not substantially skewed,γ1 = 0.3 for the 
first meeting and γ1 = −0.22 for the second meeting. Neither were the 
distributions of the stopped signals, γ1 = 0.32 and −0.33.
Two dependent variables were taken into account as measures 
of performance in the task: the number of signals prevented and the 
number of signals stopped during their presentation. The task was 
performed in two series. There was a difference in the proportion of 
tAble 2.  
Answers in the discrimination task for six trials and Four Questions
Trial
Question
1 2 3 4
1 3.69 (0.59) 3.75 (0.47) 3.59 (0.59) 3.33 (0.77)
2 3.28 (0.74) 3.32 (0.67) 3.49 (0.61) 3.31 (0.69)
3 3.19 (0.81) 3.22 (0.74) 3.41 (0.66) 3.29 (0.72)
4 2.97 (0.9) 2.89 (0.91) 3.24 (0.71) 3.12 (0.76)
5 2.94 (0.87) 2.81 (0.9) 3.15 (0.79) 3.01 (0.8)
6 2.96 (0.91) 2.94 (0.9) 3.25 (0.76) 3.02 (0.86)
Figure 3.
Mean certainty of accuracy for the first and second three 
tasks in the first and second series (meeting) shown for the 
control and experimental group. the bars show 95% confi-
dence intervals for the means.
tAble 1.  
correlations Between the Main Measures Used in the study
Measures 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Discrimination tasks 1-3 1 .45*** -.19 -.15 -.04 -.06 -.10 .06 -.05 -.03 .14 .05
Discrimination tasks 4-6 2 - -.17 -.17 0 -.02 -.11 .06 .02 .06 .12 .01
Learning task, meeting I 3 - - .46*** .52*** .33** 0 .21 .14 .09 -.13 -.17
Learning task, (avoidance), meeting I 4 - - - -.52*** -.01 .21 -.32* .26 .2 -.17 -.16
Learning task, (escape), meeting I 5 - - - - .34** -.20 .51*** -.12 -.11 .04 -.01
Learning task, meeting II 6 - - - - - .17 .23 .08 .11 -.17 -.09
Learning task, (avoidance), meeting II 7 - - - - - - -.54*** .07 .1 -.1 .05
Learning task, (escape), meeting II 8 - - - - - - - -.09 -.06 .04 .06
Divergent thinking task, meeting I 9 - - - - - - - - .75*** -.28 -.25
Divergent thinking task, meeting II 10 - - - - - - - - - -.17 -.18
Exhaustion symptoms, meeting I 11 - - - - - - - - - - .48***
Exhaustion symptoms, meeting II 12 - - - - - - - - - - -
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***, p < .001
Note. Standard deviations (in parentheses)
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prevented or stopped signals in the first series between the control and 
the experimental group, MC = .76, ME = .57, t(113) = 3.52, p < .001, d 
= 0.65. The difference in the proportion of prevented signals was not 
significant, MC = .32, ME = .38, t(114.33) = −1.14, p = .26, d = −.21, but 
the difference in the proportion of “stopping-the-not-avoided” signals 
was significant, MC = .62, ME = .29, t(114.89) = 4.8, p < .001, d = 0.88. 
Also, there was a difference in the proportion of prevented or stopped 
signals in the second series between the control and the experimental 
group, MC = .95, ME = .82, t(87.9) = 4.23, p < .001, d = 0.78. The differ-
ence in the proportion of prevented signals was not significant, MC = 
.55, ME = .63, t(110.56) = −1.02, p = .31, d = −.19, but the difference in 
the proportion of stopping-the-not-avoided signals was significant, MC 
= .73, ME = .34, t(102.67) = 4.98, p < .001, d = 0.97 (see Figure 4).
We also tested if the level of uncertainty (in the last three tasks) was 
a mediator between experimental treatment and performance in the 
escape/avoidance learning task. The mediation analysis showed no sig-
nificant mediation contribution for prevented or stopped signals (ΔR2 
= −.23, p = .37), and neither for prevented signals (ΔR2 = .35, p = .67), 
nor for stopping-the-not-avoided signals (ΔR2 = −.093, p = .67).
Hypothesis 2: Divergent Thinking 
Fluency
The divergent thinking fluency task consisted of three questions, to 
each of which the participants could give any number of responses. The 
mean number of responses given to the first Question as 2.63 (SD = 
0.94, range: 1, 6), to the second question 5.32 (SD = 2.14, range: 2, 16), 
and to the third question 4.11 (SD = 2.6, range: 0, 12). The numbers of 
responses given to the questions were correlated (from r = .33 to r = 
.54). Test reliability was acceptable, α = .65, 95% CI [.46, .84]. The mean 
value of responses to all three questions was used as the measure of 
task performance. The mean value of the measure was 4.02 (SD = 1.55, 
range: 1, 10.67). The distribution of the measure was not normal (W = 
.92, p < .001) and positively skewed (γ1 = 1.3).
The mean number of responses given in the divergent fluency task 
by participants in the control group was 3.98 (2.62, 5.24, and 4.09 for 
Questions 1, 2, and 3, respectively). In the experimental group, the 
mean value was 4.06 (2.64, 5.41, and 4.14, respectively). There was nei-
ther a significant influence of group on performance in the divergent 
fluency task, t(107.87) = −0.27, p = .78, d = −.051, nor in the second 
meeting, t(113.36) = −0.65, p = .52, d = −.012.
Hypothesis 3: Exhaustion 
Symptoms in Self-Report
The reliability of the exhaustion symptoms questionnaire was fair, 
based on data collected during the first meeting (α = .74, 95% CI [.65, 
.83]). The lowest correlation with the total score was .27 (Item 11), with 
the mean correlation being .51.The reliability was fair as well, based 
on the data collected during the second meeting (α = .82, 95% CI [.75, 
.89]). The lowest correlation with the total score was .49 (Item 1), the 
mean correlation being .58. The distribution of exhaustion measures 
was normal in the data from the first meeting (W = .96, p = .11, γ1 
= 0.21) but not in the data from the second meeting (W = .97, p = 
.004, γ1 = 0.64). The measures from the first and second meeting were 
correlated, r = .48, 95% CI [.32, .61]. The item discrimination indices 
varied from .13 to .5 (the first meeting) and from .2 to .49 (the second 
meeting).
No significant difference between the control and the experimental 
group in the measure of exhaustion recognition was noted, neither dur-
ing the first meeting, t(103.5) = −1.25, p = .21, d = −.23, nor even during 
the second one, t(100.55) = 1.65, p = .1, d = 0.31. The Bayes factor for 
the comparison of the null hypothesis versus the alternative is neither 
sufficiently high to be conclusive in the data from the first meeting (K = 
1.87) nor in the data from the second meeting (K = 1.41). 
Hypothesis 4: Escape/avoidance 
Learning in the Second Meeting
The proportion of signals prevented or stopped in the escape/avoid-
ance learning task during the second meeting was higher in the control 
group than in the experimental group in the first series, MC = .88, ME 
= .74, t(112.57) = 2.53, p = .013, d = 0.47. The proportion of prevented 
signals did not differ between the groups, MC = .46, ME = .57, t(114.72) 
= −1.57, p = .12, d = −.29, but the proportion of stopping-the-not-
avoided signals did differ, MC = .78, ME = .41, t(92.81) = 4.49, p < .001, 
d = 0.91. The proportion was also different between the groups in the 
second series, MC = .96, ME = .89, t(89.43) = 2.75, p = .007, d = 0.51. 
The proportion of prevented signals did not differ between the groups 
in the second series, MC = .52, ME = .63, t(114.72) = −1.49, p = .14, d = 
−.28, but the proportion of stopping-the-not-avoided signals did differ, 
MC = .73, ME = .34, t(102.67) = 4.48, p < .001, d = 0.97 (see Figure 4).
We also checked if the difference between groups varied between 
the first and second meeting. The repeated-measures ANOVA showed 
that there was no difference between meetings in the first series (pre-
vented or stopped signals, p = .37; prevented signals, p = .5, stopping-
the-not-avoided signals, p = .9). In the second series, there was neither 
a difference for prevented signals (p = .47) nor for stopping-the-not-
Figure 4.
Mean proportion of signals for which the participants re-
sponded either before they started (prevented) or over 
the time of their duration (stopped) in the first and second 
meeting shown for the control and experimental group. 
the bars show 95% confidence intervals for the means.
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avoided signals (p = .7), but there was a difference for prevented or 
stopped signals: In the second meeting the difference between groups 
was smaller than in the first meeting, F(1, 115) = 6.71, p = .012, η2 = 
.0092.
dIscussIon
The results of the study indicate that exposure to the unsolvable task 
may negatively influence performance in subsequent cognitive tasks 
in persons with mild intellectual disability. The situation in the experi-
ment may be compared to a situation at school when a person with in-
tellectual disability is presented with a problem that is overly demand-
ing. In our study, such an exposure affected only the performance in 
the task which required hypothesis-testing activity. 
As predicted in our first hypothesis, persons in the experimental 
group performed significantly worse than the controls in the escape/
avoidance learning task, having difficulties finding the correct way to 
escape the signal during its exposure. In the Sędek and Kofta (1990) 
study, students from the general population displayed difficulties in the 
complex avoidance condition and not in the cognitively less demand-
ing escape condition. According to the cognitive exhaustion theory 
(Kofta & Sędek, 1999; Sędek & Kofta, 1990; Von Hecker et al., 2013, 
2000), this result can be explained by the fact that the limited access 
to cognitive resources manifests itself especially in the performance of 
tasks which require more cognitive effort, while in the simple tasks, the 
available resources still allow a person to perform at a standard level. 
Our results suggest that persons with intellectual disability present a 
similar performance in the avoidance condition, but significantly differ 
in escaping the signal, as if the unsolvable task exposure resulted rather 
in increased passivity and not in the problems with finding the correct 
answer to stop the signal while engaged in such activity. This may be 
due to the fact that diminution in already limited cognitive resources in 
persons with intellectual disability leads to a tendency to hold back re-
sources in mental operations, which undermines performance even in 
simple tasks. Those persons who were able to engage in the hypothesis-
testing activity by trying to find the solution were able to avoid the 
signal as well as the control group. 
The second hypothesis, in which we predicted that the cognitive 
exhaustion state would negatively influence the performance in the 
divergent thinking fluency task, was not confirmed. Those in the ex-
perimental group did not significantly differ from the controls in the 
number of ideas generated. The result suggested that persons with 
intellectual disability may display fewer difficulties in tasks which, at 
the beginning, do not set the standard for the approved performance 
than in tasks which require them to achieve a specific goal, such as 
the escape/avoidance learning task. In accordance with the results of 
studies on learned helplessness in persons with intellectual disability 
(Weisz, 1999), we may explain our results by relating them to the prob-
able history of failure in the second type of tasks and not in the first 
one. The second explanation is that the result may be also related to 
the sequence of the tasks in the experiment. The divergent thinking 
fluency task was given immediately after the solvable escape/avoidance 
learning task, which might have allowed persons to regain control over 
their cognitive resources. The positive effects of regaining control have 
also been considered by other authors (Bukowski et al., 2014). 
The third hypothesis stated that persons with intellectual disability 
would not identify the symptoms of the cognitive exhaustion state. In 
the answers given in the questionnaire, there was no significant dif-
ference between the groups during the first and the second meeting. 
However, the results of Bayesian analysis are not conclusive as far as 
this hypothesis is concerned. The probable lack of ability to recognize 
the symptoms of cognitive exhaustion may be explained by the more 
general deficit in the ability to recognize the level of one’s performance 
(Dunning et al., 2003; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Ehrlinger et al., 
2008) or by the difficulties in connecting the performance to internal 
causes observed in persons with intellectual disability (Wehmeyer, 
1994, 2001). In our study, the internal cause of performance deficits 
was related to the temporarily decreased cognitive resources. 
The fourth hypothesis, which predicted that exposure to the un-
solvable tasks would have a long-term effect on learning effectiveness, 
was supported. After a week, the experimental group, despite being 
given success feedback in the discrimination task, still had more dif-
ficulties in escaping the signals. This may be due to the fact that the 
control group could benefit from the previous experience, whereas the 
diminished learning ability in the experimental group during the pre-
vious meeting resulted in retaining the difference in performance.
There are several limitations to the study, which need to be consid-
ered in future application. First, we decided to inform persons in the 
experimental group that the feature or element chosen in the discrimi-
nation task is incorrect since persons with intellectual disability may 
be less critical in the evaluation of their performance. We did no t-test 
whether the inconsistent information flow would negatively influence 
performance without such feedback. Another limitation is that the 
length of exposure to the unsolvable problem could be significant to 
the effects observed in the subsequent tasks. It is possible that longer 
exposure would decrease the performance in both tasks and not only 
in the escape/avoidance learning task. Also, it is important to underline 
that the relation of the cognitive exhaustion state and divergent think-
ing fluency was not tested in persons without intellectual disability, so 
we cannot rule out the possibility that the effects are specific to the 
tested group. Finally, the lack of difference in the self-report may not be 
due to the inability to recognize symptoms of learned helplessness but 
to other factors, such as an unwillingness to display discontent before 
the experimenter. 
conclusIons
In the described study, we used for the first time the informational 
model of learned helplessness to test persons with intellectual disabil-
ity. The results of the study give further credence to the well-described 
negative effect of learned helplessness on escape/avoidance learning 
(Peterson et al., 1993; Weisz, 1999). However, we did not observe that 
persons with intellectual disability had the ability to recognize the 
symptoms of diminished learning, which suggests that such persons 
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may not be aware of cognitive limitations in the same way that persons 
from the general population are (Sędek & Kofta, 1990). If these results 
are confirmed in future research, they should have implications on 
educational practices for persons with intellectual disability related to 
failure situations in the classroom and the self-reported recognition of 
cognitive limitations.
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